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The Political Economy of the Provos: Inside the Finances of the Provisional 
IRA – A Revision 
 
Abstract: Few academically rigorous accounts exist of the financial activities that 
sustained the rise of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) during the 
Northern Ireland Troubles. Through a sustained methodology this study seeks to 
challenge some popular preconceptions and address omissions in the limited 
historical record. The paper explores the organization’s evolving financial 
sophistication by analyzing PIRA’s acquisition of capital rather than its arms 
dealings. Using a new quantitative evaluation, this investigation confronts the 
prevailing understanding that Irish-American funds were of unrivalled significance to 
PIRA. It points to an array of domestic fund-raisers that collectively provided the 
overwhelming bulk of revenue. The study reveals also how PIRA developed an 
extensive reliance on criminal gangs for its expertise in illegal fund-raising, 
suggesting that moneymaking schemes were perceived as a necessary but unpopular 
by-product of the greater political objective. Finally, this paper briefly explores how 
the British authorities sought to interdict PIRA’s funding. While the general 
perception is that little was done to counteract PIRA’s financing initiatives in the 
early phases of its violent campaign, this study, nevertheless, reveals that a subtle 
counter-finance initiative did take place in Belfast across the 1970s. Overall, the 
analysis enables a more rounded comprehension of the group’s financial resilience.  
 
Civil violence surged in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, giving rise to extensive research 
into the so-called “Troubles” for decades thereafter.1 Considerable attention was devoted to 
documenting the scale and social impact of the violence.2 The activities of the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which established itself as the leading nationalist paramilitary 
actor in the conflict, naturally, became a focus for attention. Few studies, however, have 
confronted the task of investigating the inner economic workings of this most secretive of 
organizations. Cohesive and detailed analyses of how the group funded its violent campaign 
and political ascendency are few and far between. As a result, a rudimentary awareness of the 
group’s fund-raising mechanisms has tended to predominate. 
 
The following study provides a revision of the standard narratives surrounding PIRA’s 
finances. Through new research and an expanded methodology, it challenges popular 
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preconceptions and addresses omissions in the limited historical coverage. It seeks to expand 
our comprehension of the organization by exploring the economic dynamics behind the 
Provisionals’ rise, their adaptation in the face of the response to the security forces, and the 
evolving financial sophistication that underpinned their campaign. The analysis documents 
the origins of what has been considered “one of the most… heavily financed paramilitary 
organisations in the world,” as well as to assess PIRA’s fund-raising mechanisms through a 
rigorous framework.3 To facilitate this endeavor, the period between PIRA’s emergence in 
1970 until the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 will be evaluated. A key point of attention in 
this analysis is placed on PIRA’s acquisition of capital – that is to say, the accumulation of 
wealth and investments – rather than on its arms dealings, as there is a clear and often 
neglected distinction between these assets. Resultantly, this study provides a thorough 
exploration of how PIRA financially sustained itself through its thirty-year lifespan. 
 
In the first instance, the investigation will confront a prevalent understanding that Irish-
American funds were of unrivalled significance to PIRA. By cross-referencing data from the 
existing literature with under-researched primary sources, the analysis demonstrates that 
American funds were not the main contributor to PIRA’s treasury. On the contrary, an array 
of domestic fund-raisers collectively provided the overwhelming bulk of revenue, and the 
lucrativeness of these activities is proven through a quantitative evaluation. The excessive 
focus on, and arguably the sentimentalizing of, American fund-raising has resulted in the 
overlooking and under-examination of the domestic sources of PIRA income. In response, 
this research underlines PIRA’s diverse levels of finance and differentiates their varying 
numerical contributions over three decades of conflict. 
 
Concentrating on PIRA’s financing within Ireland, this study also explores the so-called 
crime-terror nexus in connection with the “Provos,” revealing how PIRA developed an 
 4 
extensive reliance on criminal gangs for its expertise in illegal fund-raising. However, it 
diverges from many common representations of PIRA as inherently “mafia-esque,” and 
demonstrates that moneymaking schemes were perceived as a necessary but unpopular by-
product of the greater political objective.4 
 
The third and final aspect of this study explores how PIRA’s domestic finances were 
understood and confronted by the security authorities during the Troubles. The general 
impression is that, at least initially, very little could be – and was – done to tackle vigorously 
PIRA’s fund-raising.5 Nevertheless, through an assessment of available public archive 
materials supplemented by interviews with ex-military, police and civil service personnel,6 
this analysis suggests that a rather subtle counter-finance initiative actually took place in 
Belfast during the 1970s, and provides an original insight into the history of the security 
forces’ efforts in Northern Ireland. Ultimately, this subtheme allows an alternative, more 
contextual, perspective of PIRA’s finances to emerge and a more rounded comprehension of 
the group’s financial resilience to be presented.  
 
A Case of Academic Neglect? 
There are inherent methodological difficulties that accompany the study of violent non-state 
organizations, and perhaps as a result, academic coverage of such groups’ finances has been 
sparse.7 The Provos are no exception, with their finances largely neglected despite an 
otherwise rich historiography on the Troubles. There have been a handful of exceptions to 
this general statement and these are worth examining to highlight the areas that deserve 
greater attention, and to reiterate the need for more in-depth research. 
 
John Horgan and Max Taylor’s two-article study, “Playing The Green Card” (1998; 2001) 
was one of the first sustained academic investigations of PIRA’s efforts to raise funds, 
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outlining in detail its main income methods, and depicting the growth of a “highly effective 
and well co-ordinated… mini empire.”8 The first article includes a table of third-party figures 
outlining the group’s growing annual income, offering a comprehensive estimate of the 
group’s treasury across the period. The authors also uncovered PIRA’s risk-averse approach 
to finance and its initial avoidance wherever possible of the more violent modes of fund-
raising. Additionally, this study considered PIRA’s accumulation of expenses beyond 
weaponry, and revealed how Sinn Féin was allocated a considerable proportion of PIRA’s 
acquired funds, causing internal tensions over resources. Their analysis does not cover the 
breadth of PIRA’s financial journey, concentrating particularly on its evolution during the 
1980s and thereby omitting other periods of interest. This is an omission that this study 
attempts to address by investigating PIRA’s chronological evolution, paying attention to the 
little studied but highly formative early years of the Troubles. Whilst Horgan and Taylor 
acknowledged that their study constituted a “rudimentary analysis” of PIRA’s fund-raising 
structure, it provides a solid foundation upon which this study builds.9 
 
The other notable study is W.A. Tupman’s 1998 article, “Where Has All the Money Gone?” 
It features a mock annual business prospectus under the name “IRA PLC,” and comprised a 
table summarizing the Republicans’ various modes of fund-raising, along with a numerical 
breakdown of each source’s estimated contribution.10 Tupman goes on to challenge these 
figures extensively, highlighting the problems with using “pseudo data,” which can be 
outdated or rely on unverified third-party information. Tupman’s paper, thereby, illustrates 
the complexities of investigating the spectrum of PIRA’s economic activity. Furthermore, 
Tupman introduces the nexus between organized crime and violent non-state actors, noting 
that illegal, institutionalized methods of fundraising are instrumental to these groups’ 
survival.  
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More general accounts of Irish Republicanism also contain useful information on PIRA’s 
financing. Toby Harnden’s 1999 examination of the role of South Armagh in the Republican 
campaign shines light on the region’s considerable fiscal contribution. Harnden is also 
effective in revealing details of British initiatives to impede PIRA’s funds after 1990.11 
Jonsson and Cornell’s (2007) article also touches upon the counter-finance effort that 
eventually developed against the IRA fund-raising schemes. However, this aspect of their 
assessment is tempered within a more general discussion about global counter-finance 
techniques and their contemporary relevance.12 Colin Clarke’s (2015) study has a chapter 
summarizing the IRA’s finance system, which is also insightful on British counter-measures, 
though is based mainly on the secondary literature.13 Consequently, the topic of British 
counter-finance initiatives continues to suggest itself as an under-researched area, which this 
study addresses in the latter sections of the article. Richard English (2003) also provides 
some additional commentary on PIRA’s key fundraising methods,14 while Tim Pat Coogan 
(1995) and Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie (1987) are also worth mentioning, particularly 
because they evaluate Sinn Féin’s electoral costs.15 These authors offer far greater coverage 
of the group’s accumulation of arms than they do of funds however, and it is this common 
conflation of weapons with finance that has sometimes obscured analysis of this topic so far. 
 
The select literature on “terrorist fundraising” offers only sporadic references to PIRA’s 
fundraising mechanisms. Nick Ridley (2012) underlines some general points about who the 
key PIRA financiers were, the logistics in financing an operation, and the group’s stringent 
accountancy and spending-discipline.16 The brevity of the assessment reinforces the scholarly 
gap on the intricacies of PIRA’s finances. The exception to this is James Adams (1986), 
whose book, The Financing of Terror, provided an important journalistic account of PIRA’s 
fund-raising. Adams’ argument, though, is somewhat partisan in perspective and, over thirty 
years on, outdated.17 Steve Kiser’s 2004 report, Financing Terror, evaluates PIRA along with 
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the Palestine Liberation Organization’s and Al-Qaeda’s fund-raising. The study relied 
predominantly on both Adams and Horgan and Taylor’s work and thus delivered a summary 
rather than new research.18 
 
The one area of PIRA’s funding that has attracted wider attention is the role of American 
sympathizers. Jack Holland’s The American Connection (1999) offers the most 
comprehensive examination of US fund-raising, albeit within a broader examination of 
PIRA-Sinn Féin’s political interactions with America, and coverage of the gunrunning 
activities on the East Coast.19 Holland’s study is serious and authoritative but one problem 
left in its wake is that because accounts of the Troubles invariably feature only brief, and 
inadequate, mentions of PIRA’s fundraising, the literature tends by default to emphasize the 
American front, thus exaggerating its importance. 
 
In summary, the limited research on this subject has resulted in a historiographical over-
reliance on individual scholars, who are often continually re-referenced  in studies of PIRA or 
of paramilitary funding.20 As a consequence, partial and sometimes simplistic accounts 
abound. The debate surrounding the financing of PIRA has largely become limited to how 
much volunteers participated in illicit fund-raising or whether funds were redirected for self-
gain.21 Clearly, there is a need for a more diligent investigation of PIRA’s financing, which 
also looks critically at the broader dynamics and vulnerabilities of this self-financed “army.” 
 
Methodology 
The methodology of this study was designed to access the most authoritative accounts of 
PIRA’s financial history.  Public archival reports by British agencies, court records, 
contextual articles, and the memoirs of former PIRA volunteers have been consulted. A series 
of first-hand interviews have also substantially informed the development of this analysis. 
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The interviewees included Sean O’Callaghan, the former head of PIRA Southern Command, 
who offered an “insider” perspective of the group’s financial logistics. This also provided the 
opportunity to question O’Callaghan on the financing schemes he referenced in his own 
memoirs, securing additional details and clarifications. Other participants included former 
military or law-enforcement personnel who served in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. 
To retain these individuals’ anonymity, they are referred to throughout as “D. Williams,” “E. 
Joyce,” “F. Cook” and “B. Hunt,” though these have no relation to their actual names. These 
interviews provided valuable insights particularly into British counter-finance initiatives that 
have, until now, been largely obscured. Additionally, this research was assisted by personal 
correspondence with PIRA experts including Jim Cusack, the leading journalist on PIRA’s 
organized crime dealings since the 1980s.  
 
It is also necessary to acknowledge the limitations of sources. There are inherent 
impediments to exploring the inner workings of violent nonstate groups. Any internal 
documentation relating to such groups are either carefully protected or have long been 
destroyed.22 Furthermore, there are broad restrictions on government files. The authors, for 
example, were denied five requests under the Freedom of Information Act – two of which 
bore the tantalising title Paramilitaries and Economic Activities in Northern Ireland (see 
appendix). Moreover, it is evident from the occasional security leak that the intelligence 
services generated reports on PIRA’s finances – particularly after 1990 according to “F. 
Cook” – but most of these are indefinitely restricted.23 Other institutions, which may 
potentially contain relevant information, such as the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB), which 
investigated PIRA’s financial ringleaders, have been shut down and their files closed to the 
public since the 2006 disarmament.24 Matters relating to PIRA are undeniably still sensitive: 
not only are there restrictions to files, key individuals are often reluctant to talk let alone 
disclose crucial information.25 Nonetheless, this study has sought to enhance the 
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methodology on this subject through the consultation of sources that have not previously 
been investigated through a financial paradigm, alongside new primary material. The 
collation of such sources has ensured that the methodological obstacles of studying a group 
“on the run” have been somewhat alleviated. Through such means this study therefore seeks 
to contribute to a credible, and critical, examination of PIRA’s finances. 
 
The Myth of the American Money-Machine 
A prevalent assumption within popular history has been that American money bank rolled 
PIRA’s treasury with the PIRA-supporting Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) in the 
United States often monopolizing the brief discussions of the group’s finances in the 
secondary sources.26 Often, in both scholary literature and informed journalistic reporting, the 
supremacy of U.S. financial support has been implicitly presumed rather than overtly stated 
largely because studies tended to focus on the United States to the exclusion of any mention 
of PIRA’s domestic funding.27 A few journalists did occasionally query the extent of the U.S. 
contribution but could not demonstrate empirically the source or extent of any historical 
exaggeration.28 James Adams’ formative study on so-called terrorist financing in the 1980s 
stands out as quite anamolous in this respect as one of the few voices to explicitly question 
the centrality of U.S. funding of PIRA.29 However, his scepticism did not resonate widely.  
 
The presumption that U.S. sources were paramount in PIRA’s campaign therefore remains 
widespread in public commentary. One BBC news report in 2001 by Jonathan Duffy, for 
example, stated that “the reality is that North America has been the most important link of 
all.”30 Writing in 2005, Anne Applebaum pronounced categorically that U.S. funds “were the 
IRA’s primary source of funding” in the 1970s.31 Other reports remarked on the significant 
impact of U.S. sources to the functioning of PIRA, but rarely went on to examine the extent 
of the actual financial contribution and usually failed to acknowledge that the amount of 
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funds received from the U.S. could have single-handedly sustained the organization over a 
period of three decades.32 
 
The contention in this analysis is that such claims like those above, which assert the pivotal 
nature of U.S. financial support to the Provos, can be challenged. The research conducted for 
this study demonstrates that the significance of U.S. funds has been exaggerated. The 
persistence of this myth has distorted historical accounts of the group’s finances. The Irish-
American diaspora was undeniably a generous fund-raiser but its importance can be reduced 
when accurately assessed alongside other income sources.  
 
First, it is helpful to outline the American financial connection. References to PIRA’s 
American funds usually relate to NORAID, the chief Republican fund-raising organization 
established in New York in 1970 by former IRA volunteer, Michael Flannery.  Around 80 
collection chapters spread across the East Coast, drawing on deeply-rooted Irish-American 
sympathies in the country. 33 Much of the money came from regular donations, fund-raising 
dinners, and the proceeds from its pro-IRA newspaper, The Irish Weekly. The cash collected 
was then secretly couriered – often “in brassieres” – to Ireland twice a month by “holidaying” 
sympathizers or by PIRA members, and normally delivered to charitable fronts like The 
Green Cross.34   
 
The U.S. authorities officially registered NORAID as an agent of the IRA in 1984.35  It was 
never listed as an illegal organization and garnered donations openly with few restraints on its 
activities. While much of the literature often speculates about whether such “charity” funds 
were illicitly diverted to the purchase of weapons, there is no doubt that American money did 
end up in PIRA’s treasury. This can be deduced from court testimony gathered for various 
gunrunning trials and from the fact that Joe Cahill, a prominent PIRA leader, maintained a 
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close relationship with NORAID (and was himself convicted for the importation of arms in 
1973). According to British sources, he was both a trustee of the “charity” and later the 
treasurer of PIRA-Sinn Féin.36 
 
To assess the contribution made by PIRA’s American allies, it is necessary to scrutinize their 
financial impact. The only official figures are those published by NORAID in its six-monthly 
returns to the Justice Department between 1971 and 1981, when the public accounts abruptly 
stopped. The records from this period state that in total just under $3 million in U.S. 
donations were sent to Ireland.37 This gives a rounded annual average figure of $300,000 for 
the period. Numerical data for the subsequent decade can be gleaned from the next most 
“official” source, NORAID’s chief executive, Martin Galvin. He stated in 1985 that the 
“organisation [had continued] raising an average of $300,000 per year” since the turn of the 
decade.38 Therefore these are the figures that will be applied henceforth. 
 
It is, nonetheless, worth noting that NORAID’s figures can be disputed. Indeed, the 
organization supposedly under-represented the amounts in its public records and there is 
evidence that “many more” donations did not pass directly through the registered cashiers of 
the organization.39 Yet whilst the published accounts are “probably a conservative total 
estimate,” it is highly unlikely they are a gross underestimation of the real amount donated 
overall by the U.S.40 Such a contention can be sustained by examining the similarities 
between the official figures and the estimations calculated by intelligence personnel. For 
instance, a leaked British Army document entitled “Future Terrorist Trends,” which came to 
be known as the “Glover Report,” after its author Brigadier James Glover, estimated that 
“overseas donations” totalled to near £120,000 in 1978, whilst NORAID declared a 
comparable sum of $175,000 for the same year.41  Given that publically declared figures do 
not dramatically diverge from the calculations made by other informed sources, gives 
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plausibility to NORAID’s data. Similarly, a contextual grounding highlights that the main 
support base in America had substantially “withered” since the 1920s.42 McKinley argues 
that thereafter, “the aid network [failed] to expand its following beyond the narrow confines 
of the sectional ‘Old Irish’ interests,” leaving a partially sympathetic population of 9 million 
Irish Americans – most of whom were working class. Wealthier Irish-Americans, particularly 
those beyond the population clusters of the North Eastern coast, had little to do with groups 
like NORAID.43 This reinforces the point that any “true” higher figure for Irish-American 
financial support for PIRA was unlikely to have been substantial. 
 
Consequently, whilst NORAID’s official figures should not be taken at face value, they 
‘”remain… the best available” and are adequate to form part of a credible assertion about this 
topic.44 It should be noted, therefore, that when discussing the homogenous subject of 
“American support,” this paper refers primarily to NORAID. Aside from the obvious data 
restrictions, this is arguably a logical approach considering the informed understanding that 
NORAID generated the overwhelming proportion of U.S. donations to PIRA’s cause.45 
Therefore, whilst it is recognized that an unquantifiable share of the funds generated in the 
U.S. was made independently of NORAID, prioritizing this major fund-raising institution still 
guarantees the most accurate representation of America’s fiscal contribution to the Provos. 
 
Alternative Incomes  
The reassessment of the significance of American financial support rests on revealing PIRA’s 
superior domestic fund-raising mechanisms. Hence, it is important to now turn to the money 
generated from the plethora of PIRA’s non-U.S. sources of income. Seven major revenue 
streams can be highlighted that developed mainly, though not exclusively, around Northern 
Ireland during the course of the Troubles. The summaries below build on the existing 
knowledge of these areas with new primary material. It should be noted that the fund-raisers 
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developed in the 1970s are explored first to emphasize their importance for PIRA’s 
subsequent financial evolution. These included: 
 
Associated clubs/ “shebeens” (illegal-drinking-clubs)  
Paramilitary-run pubs were established in the wake of civil disorder across Northern Ireland, 
initially functioning to provide safe areas for local communities to congregate. Over twenty 
Republican-controlled drinking-clubs soon evolved into major fund-raising fronts, with clubs 
like “The Felons” allegedly handing over a large proportion of the profits to PIRA.46 
According to Sean O’Callaghan, the clubs reduced their costs by selling “stolen alcohol… 
[and] fags, [and] taking over derelict buildings.”47 Moreover, republicans would get cheaper 
rates on ales from sympathizers in the local breweries.48 Whilst many of the PIRA-run clubs 
became “legalized,” they nonetheless “all ran two sets of books”’ to obscure the diversion of 
funds to PIRA affiliated organizations, as well as to hide the extent of their illicit 
profiteering.49 These illegal sub-businesses included distributing huge quantities of smuggled 
alcohol for inflated prices, and hugely lucrative slot machines. Clubs were also valuable 
money-laundering vehicles, passing huge sums of cash. Indeed, Jim Cusack estimates they 
were “[PIRA’s] main source of day-to-day money” initially, with many later sold on in the 
1990s “at the top of the market.”50  Tupman contends that the clubs were not wholly owned 
by PIRA, but “Hunt” – a former senior police officer with the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC) – asserts that they were “firmly under their control,” and were considerable income 
generators.51 
 
Protection rackets/extortion/kidnappings 
Racketeering was amongst the first of PIRA’s organized fund-raising tactics. Profits surged 
as the main paramilitaries, including the Provos, ordered the companies in their areas to pay 
them or face destruction or kidnapping.52 Upholding the credibility of these threats ensured 
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prosperity, with a student “Club Bar” amongst those fire-bombed in the mid-1970s for 
refusing to pay up.53 Rackets were described by Adams as being a “low risk and a regular 
source of income,” having quickly developed into legitimate “security companies.”54 
Kidnappings on the other hand were, according to Bishop and Mallie, only really conducted 
during “shortage[s] of money” as opposed to being a regular source of income.55 
Interestingly, Horgan and Taylor claim that an end was put to this unpopular fund-raiser by 
1983, but O’Callaghan’s memoir argues that a financial strain forced the renewal of 
kidnapping in that year.56 
 
Black cabs 
A major share of the profits generated from the Falls Taxi Company provided a highly 
fruitful source of PIRA’s income.57 As will be discussed later, its success is evidenced by the 
attention counter-financing agencies granted it. Horgan and Taylor refer to these three 
business models – “security” companies, clubs and cabs – as a “mini empire.”58 The origins 
of this mini business empire are disputed however. Adams claims that PIRA bombed 300 
buses with the express purpose of creating an alternative transport system in West Belfast in 
order to raise funds, though O’Callaghan argues that it was an “after-thought.”59  “Hunt” 
supports the latter, highlighting that ordinary entrepreneurs first bought London cabs to 
exploit the regional unrest, rather than as a premeditated paramilitary fundraiser.60  
 
Libyan donations 
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi first met with PIRA’s finance director, Joe Cahill, at the 
end of 1972. It is no secret that the regime donated considerable weaponry, but wider 
research has confirmed they also made sporadic, sizeable cash contributions.61 
 
Armed robberies  
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PIRA formally began robberies after 1973. They made up a considerable percentage of the 
annual income thereafter, with Horgan and Taylor describing robberies as a key, “if not the 
single main source” of funding.62 Moreover, an archival report cites a PIRA pamphlet from 
1975, which noted “a lot of the movement’s finance stems from robberies.”63 Whilst it took 
hundreds of heists to generate a sizeable income, sometimes the group struck lucky, with a 
unit seizing over £220,000 in a single train robbery in March.1976.64 “Hunt” also claims that 
the group’s leadership implemented a minimum objective of £10,000 per robbery by 1980 to 
justify the risk of capture or infiltration they brought.65  
 
Fraud in the 1970s and 1980s 
Internal government memos in the archival files document suspicions of PIRA-run frauds for 
1976-1977, with concerns of construction fraud “on a mammoth scale” raised in the House of 
Commons.66 “Hunt” explains that PIRA’s members would intimidate a construction manager 
into claiming insurance tax for “ghost workers,” and the surplus would go to the 
organization.67 Another method supposedly involved bombing buildings with the agreement 
of the owner, and sharing the subsequent compensation. Security officials also noted that 
social security fraud was a common source of PIRA in this period.68 Social security swindles 
also sometimes made national news, with one Daily Mail article from 1976 bearing the 
dramatic headline, “YOUR MONEY FOR IRA GUNS – prisoners mastermind £20m 
SOCIAL SECURITY FRAUD.”69  Cusack, furthermore, also refers to West Belfast as “a 
social welfare black hole.”70 A more sophisticated fraud network emerged in the 1980s: a 
theme that is explored in greater later in this assessment. Essentially, the 1980s saw PIRA 
“come up with more and clever frauds,” leading to large-scale scams and money laundering – 
some of which operated on an international scale.71  
 
Smuggling 
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South Armagh was at the centre of the smuggling industry, with a long history of financing 
the local IRA brigade. By the 1980s, PIRA leaders ordered the unit to share and centralize its 
income – arguably making smuggling the most lucrative source of funding for the group, 
generating, according to “Hunt,” a “tremendous, tremendous source of funds.”72 Resident 
PIRA operatives ran the business, moving stolen alcohol, cigarettes, cattle, and fuel across 
the border for increased levies. This fund-raiser has been greatly underplayed by general 
accounts of the Troubles, despite it being a highly effective mechanism because the security 
forces “couldn’t touch it.”73 
 
These seven income streams illustrate the extensive breath of non-U.S. sources, 
demonstrating the centrality not of Boston but of Belfast in PIRA’s finance. To highlight the 
extensive capital generated by these local fund-raisers, Table 1 below provides a tentative 
calculation of their fiscal contributions. Again, presenting exact quantitative information is 
close to impossible, with the Provisionals concealing their central accounts on the one hand, 
while the media has been accused of making wildly exaggerated estimations on the other.74 
Notwithstanding this obstacle, there are some accessible, credible, figures that can be 
employed as a baseline. Appendix 1 provides a breakdown for each calculation and the 
sources for each data set. 
 
Table 1: Estimate of PIRA’s Annual Income 
 
Alternative SOURCES OF INCOME* Tentative ANNUAL total   
Associated clubs £1,444,000 
Protection rackets/Kidnappings N/A  
Black cabs £500,000 
Libyan donations £100,000 
Robberies £255,000 
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Fraud N/A 
SUM TOTAL:  £2, 299,000 
 1980s onwards:  
Fraud £1,203,600 
Smuggling £2, 216,000 
 
 
*This list is not exhaustive. It should be noted that there were numerous other fund-raising 
mechanisms, including donations from the Irish Republic, collection buckets, counterfeit 
money, and a property portfolio consisting of 350 houses in Belfast alone.75  
 
While this table can only be indicative of the true scale of PIRA’s income, what it is able to 
elucidate is the lucrativeness of PIRA’s “home-grown” fund-raisers. Crucially, it also shows 
that the non-U.S. fundraisers were by far the chief source of income in the first decade of 
PIRA’s campaign. This can be seen in that the estimated annual figure for the non-U.S. 
sources of income came to £2,299,000 in the 1970s, whilst NORAID’s official average figure 
stood at $300,000 (£136,363).76 Even when applying an inflated NORAID contribution of 
$500,000 (£227,273) – per year (defectors claim that between 1969 and 1981, nearly $5 
million was contributed by the organization), the collective domestic sum remains far 
greater.77 Though the total estimation for the alternative fund-raisers is tentative, it is not 
dissimilar from O’Callaghan’s claim that PIRA was accumulating around £2 million a year 
by 1981.78 Hence, this table can be considered a credible summation.  
 
The second element of the table highlights that the gap between U.S. and non-U.S. incomes 
was stretched further still after the 1980s. The data illustrates how far domestic finances had 
expanded in the latter half of PIRA’s campaign, giving rise to sources of revenue that 
contributed fourfold to what NORAID representatives claimed it had donated.79  Indeed, as a 
result of PIRA’s domestic financial expansion, its income supposedly reached its highest 
levels yet in this period, generating sufficient funds to subsidise Sinn Féin’s costly political 
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strategy well into the millennium.80 Overall, therefore, this numerical examination 
substantiates the contention that an emphasis on the American funding of PIRA is unfounded. 
 
Beyond the Numbers 
Aside from a quantitative examination of funds however, the rejection of America’s 
economic centrality can also be reinforced through corroboration with qualitative sources. 
First, there is a consensus amongst the first-hand interviewees that America was a 
considerable but by no means paramount source of income for PIRA. One interviewee, Sean 
O’Callaghan, served on the Army Council, which maintained the key decision-making role 
on PIRA’s finances. O’Callaghan asserts that the initial funds from the US “started to die off 
very, very quickly” after 1972, and were too small to maintain the campaign alone.81 To 
illustrate this, he points to the drastic and unpopular initiation of bank robberies in 1973 as a 
necessary consequence of NORAID’s fleeting support. O’Callaghan added that “the money 
was essentially coming from Belfast,” and made specific reference to the illegal clubs, taxis, 
and banditry. Further, he emphasized, “South Armagh was raising a lot of money, a lot of 
money.”82 This view is supported by the interview with ex-military operative, “D. Williams.” 
He proclaimed, too, that there was “huge money coming from the U.S., but the vast majority 
of the money was being raised here in Ireland” by the semi-legitimate businesses.83 “Hunt,” 
the senior RUC officer, maintained that the findings outlined in this paper had “totally 
reinforced [his] suspicions that the role of American funds were grossly exaggerated.”84 
 
Another set of important qualitative sources is provided by available government documents. 
Notably, one brief by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) from March 1976, categorically 
stated: “We believe that money from the U.S represents under 20 per cent of the P.I.R.A total 
income: by far the greatest amount comes from criminal activity in Ireland, particularly from 
bank robberies… The P.I.R.A campaign is aided but does not depend on US financial help.”85 
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Crucially, this report allows rare insight to official thinking and provides compounding 
evidence that U.S. funds were not of primary importance: a point further reinforced by the 
more widely cited 1978 “Glover report,” which estimated that American donations made up 
only 13 per cent of PIRA’s overall funds by the mid-1970s.86 Therefore, whilst government 
research can be fallible, it is clear from the sources available that U.S. funds quickly became 
a secondary facet of PIRA’s treasury. 
 
Such a finding is strengthened by the recovery of James Adams’ preliminary reporting of this 
subject in 1987. Adams’ investigation explicitly claimed: “the terrorists make far more 
[money] from slot machines than they ever did from NORAID,”87 reiterating that the 
seemingly more obscure sources of income easily out-funded the U.S. This paper has built 
upon this early claim with increased methodological rigor and in-depth analysis. Existing 
literature on the subject sometimes implicitly supports this contention but is less definitive. 
For instance, Holland’s The American Connection places much greater emphasis on the 
impact of Irish-America on arms smuggling than it does on their monetary contribution, 
implying that funds from the U.S. were not the primary element of the trans-Atlantic link. 
Furthermore, Horgan and Taylor’s study includes only one mention of “Irish-American” 
fund-raisers. Whilst the authors do not explicitly question the importance of U.S. funds as 
this analysis does, the uncharacteristic neglect of NORAID suggests they prioritized the 
domestic sources of income too. 
 
Finally, although much of the literature perpetuates the central role of American funding, it 
broadly accepts that they faltered in the final stages of PIRA’s campaign. For instance, 
Holland acknowledges that “by the 1990s [NORAID’s] fundraising role had diminished… 
and it was [mainly] a lobbying group.”88 Moloney also identifies a tangibly reduced interest 
in America thereafter.89 He notes that even Irish Republican leaders’ attempts in the late-
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1990s to re-connect Americans through the newly established broader international grouping, 
“Friends of Sinn Féin,” proved disappointing, with “hopes for millions of dollars never 
materialis[ing].”90 It is also worth noting that the United Kingdom Foreign Office suspected 
that after 1982 large sums of Irish-Americans’ economic sympathies were diverted to the 
Irish American Defense Fund to pay accused gunrunner Michael Flannery’s legal costs.91 
Hence, although no official NORAID accounts exist for this latter period, a spectrum of 
alternative material indicates America’s faltering financial commitment. 
 
Periodic and Material Impact 
Nonetheless, whilst endorsing the need for a substantive revision of the received wisdom on 
this topic, we must be cautious in downplaying the American connection. The primary 
sources consulted did not categorically dismiss American donations. Instead, there is a 
consensus that when roused, U.S supporters could temporarily generate significant funds. 
O’Callaghan’s testimony illustrates the point in claiming that NORAID was vital at two 
critical junctures in the PIRA’s campaign.92 Therefore, to ensure that the role of American 
funding is not improperly discounted, the enhanced role of U.S. support at the stages to which 
O’Callaghan alludes will be examined. Still, it must be noted that these phases of impact 
were the exception rather than the rule across the thirty years – a distinction that the current 
literature has largely failed to capture. 
 
The first period where O’Callaghan believes American donations were ‘”hugely important,” 
is in the “very, very early days” of the renewed militancy – when the newly established 
Provos were competing for resources and personnel with the “Official” IRA faction.93  
Developing a functioning operational structure was vital for the embryonic PIRA’s survival, 
and the existing literature readily acknowledges how the leaders “naturally” and almost 
instinctively looked first to America in 1969/70.94 Joe Cahill was sent swiftly on a 
 21 
preliminary fund-raising tour of the U.S., where he secured the loyalty of many Irish-
Americans ahead of the “Officials.”95 The level of initial funds donated by U.S. sympathizers 
is noted in the 1976 NIO Brief, which estimates that at least $1.2 million (£545,455) had been 
couriered to Ireland between 1970 and 1973. Certainly, the ready ability of New York’s 
“Thursday Night Committee” to mobilize under Cahill to provide over a million dollars in the 
space of three years is indicative of the centrality, economic vitality, and reliability of Irish-
American support at this time. America’s importance here was also heightened by the delay 
in establishing domestic fund-raisers, with O’Callaghan reiterating, “there’s [still] nothing 
else” – although it is rumoured that some initial aid came from the Irish and Syrian 
governments.96 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the American funds were the 
Provos’ dominant contributor in this brief timeframe, and that the U.S. provided the vital 
kick-start to the military campaign PIRA initiated following the IRA’s political split in 1970.  
 
The second and crucial period of American funding identified by O’Callaghan was 1981, a 
year dominated by the Maze hunger strikes. The period was one of unprecedented 
international attention for PIRA, with prisoner Bobby Sands being elected as a Member of 
Parliament shortly before his death. At this point, O’Callaghan states that “Irish America 
brings in loads of money… it did bring in a lot more money,” suggesting a tangible increase 
from its, by then, non-core, funding role.97 This is also hinted in Cahill’s biography, which 
notes that in 1981 he made his second major U.S. visit to “drum up financial support,” which 
was regarded as a generally fruitful expedition.98 O’Callaghan also confirms that whilst the 
money was publicized as being for the benefit of the dying prisoners, “lots of the money… 
really went to the IRA.”99 O’Callaghan further underlines the importance of NORAID’s 
contribution at this point when he claimed that temporarily, “the whole [smuggling] thing sort 
of collapsed.” Clearly, during this phase, U.S. donations became a primary source of 
income.100 Hence, although PIRA’s levels of violence dropped between 1981 and 1982, this 
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spike in American aid provided the group with a £100,000 reserve it spent on exploiting the 
hunger strikes into a major publicity success for the movement, thus illustrating NORAID’s 
periodic impact.101 
 
However, this study has illustrated that the dominance of American funds in both instances 
was short-lived. Their initial importance amidst PIRA’s early evolution can be seen as a 
fleeting moment of necessity, with U.S. funding diminished by the speedy initiation of the 
domestic fund-raisers. NORAID’s renewed importance in 1981 can be noted as equally brief. 
O’Callaghan discerned that as quickly as 1983, U.S. donations were in decline; observing that 
PIRA were “again desperate enough to do the kidnappings,”102 with NORAID’s influence 
declining hereafter. Essentially, this illustrates that these timeframes were not representative 
of NORAID’s overall financial contribution, and that PIRA was unable to survive on U.S. 
donations alone for extended periods. 
 
A final distinction to make is that whilst the U.S. was financially peripheral for most of 
PIRA’s operational history, it provided other important areas of support. Most notably, 
America was PIRA’s main source of arms supplies, as evidenced by the Boston gunrunning 
ring led by George Harrison up until his arrest in 1981.103 Nonetheless, the literature has been 
prone to confuse “the [vital] value of the United States as an armoury to PIRA” with its 
secondary role as a financier.104 Even O’Callaghan’s memoir fails to differentiate them, 
stating that America’s “supplying of guns and money… helped the IRA in a real and 
quantifiable way,” which is to some extent true but, as this study has shown, is a point that 
needs to be accurately contextualized.105 Only in interview did O’Callaghan clarify that 
America was of far greater assistance in the provision of armaments than of finance.106 It is 
therefore apparent that the conflation of U.S. financial aid with non-fiscal supplies has over 
the years somewhat distorted the perception of America’s economic role in supporting PIRA. 
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In summary, this section has sought to highlight that NORAID was only one of many modes 
of income, and other fund-raisers were often much more lucrative. The extensive role of the 
domestic mechanisms as the key “day-to-day” fund-raisers has been emphasized through a 
new quantitative examination. Crucially, for the first time, the margin in funds between U.S. 
and non-U.S. income mechanisms has been presented in binary terms, thus proving NORAID 
was not PIRA’s primary fund-raiser. Instead, the historical role of American donations can be 
best documented as a short-term expedient, with PIRA utilizing the U.S. as a reliable source 
of funding, without the associated risks involved with illegal methods of financing. Finally, 
as Tupman asserts, “the problem of verifiability needs to be borne in mind constantly when 
[using] pseudo data,” and it is an unavoidable truism that the exact amounts contributed to 
PIRA will remain obscure.107 Therefore, it should be reiterated that the conclusions made 
here are only inferences that allow a foundation for further research. 
 
The Origins and Development of PIRA’s Organized Crime Link  
Given the central claim that U.S. based funds were not the foremost source of PIRA’s 
finance, this argument goes on to explore the group’s entry into the underground criminal 
financing network during the 1980s. It is the additional contention that it was these domestic 
fund-raising mechanisms that constituted the predominant form of funding. The 1980s saw 
PIRA join the growing trend of insurgencies that adopt “white-collar, and “organized crime” 
to fund their campaigns.108 For the purposes of this study the idea of organized crime can be 
broadly divided into fraud (taking a percentage from prisoner welfare benefits, social security 
deception; illegal logging, cultivating or refining narcotics, video, CD and cassette piracy; 
taxi scams such as running unregistered taxis; not paying taxes), smuggling (cigarettes, 
alcohol, narcotics, humans), racketeering (extorting percentages from prostitution, human 
smugglers, narcotic trafficking, forging of identity and travel documents, drinking clubs, taxi 
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services), kidnapping for ransom, and armed robbery. Such practices outlived the group itself, 
and the remnants of the IRA are now depicted as professional, money-driven criminals.109 
Regardless of the factuality of these claims, they neglect the context in which PIRA initiated 
its criminal financing apparatus three decades ago. To address this point, the study 
investigates PIRA’s early engagements in organized criminality, highlighting the Provos’ 
vulnerabilities and historical motives. 
 
First, PIRA’s organized crime link stemmed from an urgent need for significant funds. 
Despite the success of the fund-raisers listed earlier, the growing financial burden upon the 
organization in the 1980s should not be underestimated. The Irish Republican movement 
generally became ever more desperate for money as Sinn Féin launched its electoral 
campaign, outspending all other local parties.110 Heightened costs also arose from PIRA’s 
expansion, which demanded ever more prisoner-support funds and expensive and 
sophisticated weaponry.111 According to O’Callaghan, PIRA’s organized crime involvement 
therefore emerged amidst a general objective to “expand, expand, expand,” and to formalize a 
durable financing strategy that could sustain the group in what was becoming a “long war.”112 
Moreover, “discreet” white-collar crime fitted the criteria for acquiring funds that avoided 
damaging publicity, which would hinder Irish Republican electoral prospects. Crucially, 
O’Callaghan emphasizes that it was only “grudgingly” that PIRA became “willing to engage 
with people who were more criminal.”113 Hence, the hesitant adoption of organized crime 
techniques can be seen to have arisen from the twin demands of an increasingly prominent 
electoral strategy following the 1981 hunger strikes and from a serious need for war funds. 
 
The picture that emerges from the research is that PIRA subsequently had to learn organized 
crime techniques from individuals outside the immediate Republican movement. Whilst 
PIRA members are now often described as gangsters, most volunteers in the 1980s “didn’t 
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have the knowledge” to conduct elaborate financial crimes – with few even having bank 
accounts.114 The group consequently consorted with hardened criminals who O’Callaghan 
refers to as the “dodgy business people” to learn new scams. This included a new 
acquaintance with the London-based crime syndicate run by the Adams brothers, who were 
“always… ahead of the game” and crafted some “ingenious” ways to make money, which 
PIRA then replicated.115 Additionally, specialist financial knowledge was garnered from 
various Provo members’ time in prison interacting with individuals who had been convicted 
for those very offenses.116 Jim Cusack claims PIRA also had “a very large financial network 
linked to Irish-American gangster elements,” which was rooted in the arms smuggling trade 
and masterminded by Whitey Bulger and the Boston Mafia.117 
 
As a result of PIRA’s external consultations with expert fraudsters, the movement developed 
collaborative partnerships with local gangs to conduct more sophisticated and larger-scale 
fraud, smuggling, and counterfeiting.118  For example, PIRA jointly coordinated various 
international cigarette smuggling operations, with the organized crime factions storing the 
imported goods in their mainland safe houses until they could be transported to Ireland.119 To 
some degree the scale of this trade can be evidenced by the extensive lung disease reported in 
the Northern Ireland counties, whose inhabitants were the main consumers of the counterfeit 
tobacco.120 However, PIRA’s most significant lesson was how to invest illegally obtained 
cash. The group mastered the arts of registering a wealth of properties and new companies 
under “clean” business fronts, which then invested the money on behalf of PIRA. A good 
example was the development of the Odyssey entertainment complex in Belfast. Legal 
restrictions prevent this paper naming the owner, however, “Cook,” a former Senior Special 
Branch officer, reveals that the complex was valued at £51 million in 2004, at which stage 
police intelligence uncovered that PIRA related enterprises owned 20 per cent of its equity 
through the nameless businessman.121 Cusack also points to the emerging front-businesses in 
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Belfast’s Conway Mill as a hub of these activities in the mid-1980s. The Mill is also 
referenced in Joe Cahill’s biography, which comments that the “community projects” there 
were overseen by his brother.122 On the whole, these pseudo-legitimate dealings provided 
PIRA with a discreet and secure financial profile. 
 
This “invaluable” network is thought to have continued expanding throughout the decade, 
leaving PIRA with an unquantifiable number of investments that “permeated every level of 
Northern Ireland business.”123 Its early success can be noted via a reference in O’Callaghan’s 
memoirs, which records that after 1983, “money appeared to be less of a problem.”124 Indeed, 
by the 1990s, this sophisticated and lucrative fund-raising mechanism had become PIRA’s 
main income source, with academics, journalists, and law-enforcement personnel alike 
arguing that it “became very much a Mafia-esque organisation.”125 It is telling to note that the 
ongoing claims of “Green Godfathers” of crime operating beyond the ceasefire can be traced 
back to PIRA-Sinn Féin having lost control of its criminal network.126 By 1998, security 
force sources believe that the central leadership wanted to stop these illegal dealings.127 Yet 
these activities had provided “very nice lifestyles” for the likes of former PIRA chief of staff, 
Thomas “Slab” Murphy, and according to “Cook,” such individuals involved refused to 
stop.128 Herein lie the roots of the organized crime networks that still permeate the region 
today.  
 
In summary, the 1980s witnessed a greater level of complexity in how PIRA functioned and 
raised its domestic funds. Organized crime connections kept the armed insurgency and its 
political front financially afloat over the latter half of the campaign, contradicting Moloney’s 
claim that PIRA-Sinn Fein was “broke” by 1996.129 In essence, contrary to popular 
depictions, the majority of PIRA’s volunteers were not inherently criminal fundraising 
experts, and did not immediately become so. In reality, the group was reticent about 
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becoming dependent on mafia-style individuals, and it was the underlying necessity for funds 
that had been the catalyst. 
 
British Counter-financing 
The final area this analysis explores is the British government’s operations to impede PIRA’s 
finances during the Troubles.  This study observes that the British effort to obstruct PIRA’s 
income mechanisms can be seen as lacklustre, and offers insights and critiques of the various 
initiatives pursued. It should be noted that the emphasis is on the period up until 1990, as the 
subsequent era saw a more focused security effort and has been more widely reported. 
Primarily, this section brings to light a covert counter-finance operation undertaken by the 
RUC’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Special Branch in the 1970s. This is a 
side of the security force effort that has, largely, yet to be publicly documented and analyzed. 
Crucially, this section will demonstrate that contrary to established thinking, the first decade 
of PIRA’s existence was not totally void of counter-financing activities.  
 
Fundamentally, the British counter-finance employed a two-pronged approach: policing and 
legislative. Amongst the earliest schemes led by security personnel, were the RUC’s anti-
racketeering units, known colloquially as the “Al Capone squad.”130  “Cook,” who worked 
amongst the upper ranks of the RUC, confirms that these squads were established in 1983 
with the “express purpose” of targeting paramilitaries’ extortion units and their clubs.131 The 
Sunday Times provided frequent coverage of plans to “attack terrorist cash” (1988), and the 
proposed “war against racketeers who back[ed] PIRA’ (1988).132 Yet, “Cook” argues the C19 
and C13 squads represented the full extent of the police’s counter-finance effort during the 
1980s, and were made up of only 15 RUC officers who were trained detectives rather than 
financial investigators.133 Moreover, this former officer claims that C19 “almost exclusively 
focused on Protestant paramilitaries as it was so easy to recruit informants in them,” 
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demonstrating a further lack of focus on PIRA.134 Even so, O’Callaghan grants the anti-
racketeering team more credit, arguing that whilst it had limitations and “couldn’t cut off the 
funds,” PIRA indirectly faced “huge pressure” in Belfast from their presence and “constant 
raiding.”135 
 
At an institutional level, the late 1980s saw revised antiterrorist legislation, which 
criminalized the funding of violent political organizations like PIRA and allowed the 
confiscation of their assets.136 Yet relative lack of evaluation in the primary sources of the 
effectiveness of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Northern Ireland Emergency Powers 
Act on the financing of illegally armed organizations are indicative of their negligible impact 
on PIRA: an observation underlined by the fact that there were only four successful 
prosecutions for terrorist-financing before 1989.137 Certainly, convictions were difficult to 
come by under the legislation, which according to “Cook” was worsened by the apathy of 
local judges towards fund-raising activities. This interviewee added that the prosecuting 
authorities were often “reluctant to pursue cases which… [had] very little chance of 
recovering actual funds from the terrorists who just moved it down South or abroad.”138 Even 
after the introduction of the 2000 Terrorism Act, the challenge of proving fund-raisers’ direct 
affiliation to PIRA persists to this day. As a result, “Slab” Murphy, who law-enforcement 
agencies believed was a key PIRA financier, was sentenced to jail in 2016 not for assisting 
the organization but for tax evasion instead.139 
 
Likewise, the archives reveal useful insights into the various British governmental attitudes to 
confronting PIRA’s finances. In one instance, an internal report comments on suspicions that 
social security was contributing to sustaining nationalist paramilitary factions.140 Yet the 
political impossibility of imposing a solution is contained within the same report, and the 
concept of infiltrating PIRA funds abandoned. Primarily though, the focus of the authorities 
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appears to have fixated on impeding American funding. A 1974 report on PIRA’s fund-
raising was wholly orientated around U.S. donations and documented the visit of John Hume, 
then Minister of Commerce in the short-lived Sunningdale Power Sharing Executive, to 
America to lobby against U.S. financial support for PIRA.141 This focus was replicated again 
in a “Thatcher Council Agenda” in 1984, which proposed political intervention “against the 
raising of funds [for PIRA] in the United States.”142 However, as shown earlier, the level of 
NORAID’s contribution was comparatively small, and therefore the degree of attention 
focused on interdicting PIRA’s transnational finances was arguably ineffective in inflicting 
real damage to their treasury. 
 
In essence, the primary research conducted for this study reveals a piecemeal and largely 
ineffective counter-financing effort in the first half of the campaign against PIRA on the part 
of the British state. Arguably, this stemmed principally from the inevitable absence of law-
enforcement resources when confronted with widespread violent unrest.143 Conceivably, the 
financial aspects of the conflict came to be seen of secondary significance in the broader 
security effort. Martyn Frampton, one of the foremost academics on the Irish Republican 
movement, speculates that there was also a “failure of imagination” within the security 
forces, with senior police and civil servants paying mainly lip service to the targeting of 
funds.144 The lack of cooperation with the Irish Republic further hindered the counter-finance 
effort, with “Hunt” claiming the Irish police, the Garda Síochána, was ambivalent in its role 
against PIRA, and also lacked “the money or… expertise” to be of assistance.145 It is perhaps 
as a result of these various issues having been largely addressed by 1990, and the 
enforcement of a comprehensive strategy, that the final decade of the campaign saw an 
improved disruption of PIRA’s funds, employing the resources of MI5 to “hurt them 
badly.”146 
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The Anomaly: A New Insight from “D. Williams” 
Despite the seemingly limited effort to combat PIRA’s finances during the early period of the 
British security effort, this study has uncovered an important inconsistency. The revelation 
suggests that a secret operation to target PIRA’s domestic fund-raising finances was initiated 
as early as 1974 by a military intelligence officer posted to Northern Ireland, “D. Williams.” 
The insight into this counter-finance effort is based largely on “Williams’” first-hand 
account, having agreed to be interviewed for this study. His assertions are supported, where 
possible, by fellow interviewees, who were in active service during the period in question.  
 
It is worth noting in advance that “Williams” claims that the operation under review was in 
communal terms “indiscriminate,” in the sense that it sought, in principle, to target “both the 
Catholics and the Prods [sic – Protestants].”147 Nonetheless, “Joyce” – a British civil servant 
based in Northern Ireland – concedes that there may have been somewhat of a natural bias to 
concentrate on Republican finances, not least because Loyalists did not have the same large 
areas of control in Belfast, and hence the urgency was focused on PIRA.148 “Joyce” also 
maintained that at its core this counter-finance operation was viewed “as a way to disrupt 
PIRA” and to seize on its vulnerabilities as a self-funded movement.149 Consequently, this 
analysis refers to this operation only in its objective to impede PIRA’s funds. 
 
The roots of this unprecedented operation supposedly began following “Williams’” 
recommendation to law enforcement agencies in the early 1970s, that tackling paramilitary 
violence necessitated “cut[ting] off the head of the snake” – namely, the funds that sustained 
their campaigns.150 “Williams” had accompanied police on a raid in which the RUC were 
elated to find weapons, but, according to his account, he concentrated on the seized 
documents pertaining to PIRA’s funds. “Joyce” confirmed “Williams’” role in initiating the 
operation, noting the establishment of a special Committee on Paramilitary Economics in 
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response.151 Despite the pressure to focus directly on reducing the violence, the security 
forces thus became convinced that the “criminal side” of these groups – namely, the illegal 
fund-raising – required some attention, and action was authorized.  
 
What subsequently emerged was an early “anti-funds squad” centred on the PIRA’s heartland 
of Belfast. It was “led by experienced fraud investigators from the then HM Customs and 
Excise” Department, and assisted by the “best detectives and [mainland] CID officers,” one 
of whom was recruited specifically for his experience combating organized crime, which 
included securing convictions against the Kray brothers, the notorious East London crime 
gang.152  “Williams” asserts that the responsibility fell to the Special Branch in Great Britain 
because the Northern Ireland police force was under overwhelming pressure to restore order 
in the first instance amidst civil collapse.153  “Joyce” also adds that the RUC had an 
ambivalent reputation, and wanted to avoid provocation where possible.154 Therefore, the 
counter-finance mission initially fell to this specially created squad. 
 
Thereafter, it is contended, a “deeply covert proactive investigation,” ensued. The 
interviewees maintain that the initiative was successful in “building an incredible model” that 
mapped PIRA’s finance network.155 Months of work rewarded the team with a growing 
understanding of where the money came from, and how it moved. For instance, well aware 
that the Falls Taxi Company was under PIRA’s control, the team took to investigating “where 
all the bank accounts [we]re… who the taxi drivers were etc.”156 The subsequent deliberation 
over how to employ this information and who to target, resulted in the decision to employ 
“old fashioned civil law.”157  “Cabbies” were the first targets, confronted for offences such as 
failure to declare their earnings, lacking a vehicle tax disc, or for using red (non-duty paid) 
diesel. “Williams” recalls that occasionally army road blocks would be set up in city districts, 
with the purpose of “get[ting] every single taxi for something.”158 Another major operation 
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that has been more widely documented is the closing down of paramilitary “Shebeens.” 
Again, the offense was not for their paramilitary affiliations but tax-related or for failure to 
obtain a license. 
 
However, the anti-finance squad’s vision was broader, and, fundamentally, the real value of 
these targets was providing leads into the higher ranks of PIRA and their central holding 
accounts. This was known as “Watching the money flow,” and “Williams” emphasizes that 
“asset-tracing to recover and confiscate ill-gotten gains” was the main objective of these 
minor operations.159 As a measure of their initial success, “Williams” recounts: 
 
…in the first operation after about four months work we took out 29 people one 
morning and charged them with over 160 separate offences… all were convicted. This 
caused some panic in the ranks as they tried to recover the bank accounts, which we 
had frozen… and we were able to identify the next level of paymasters.160 
 
“Williams” estimates that may be hundreds, “but not thousands” of assets were frozen in total 
between 1977 and 1979.161 However, assessing the real success of this mission is contentious, 
since the Belfast Court Records were not available for verification and insiders on both sides 
of the conflict generally disregard the impact of counter-finance initiatives.162 “Williams,” 
too, concedes that it took until around 1980 to see meaningful results, but maintains that “A” 
Branch “caused horrendous disruption” to PIRA in the subsequent decade.163 The operation 
can also be attributed as an intelligence success, with Special Branch able to coordinate 
across departments and with informers to acquire information about who ran the clubs and 
their paramilitary associations. “Williams” asserted that because “it’s civil stuff… people will 
talk to you,” and many unsuspecting locals revealed crucial PIRA related information.164 
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Still, major challenges remained for this operation, including finding PIRA’s holding 
accounts.  “Williams” emphasizes that locating these funds and understanding the flows was 
no simple task, requiring “hours and hours, looking at bank statements.”165 Another obstacle 
was acquiring the warrants to freeze assets once they were identified, which were not granted 
lightly. “Williams” explains that acquiring evidence was the biggest obstacle of all, clarifying 
that there was no chance of “forensics” and “word of mouth wasn’t good enough.”166 This 
view is supported by “Cook,” who adds that prosecution was unlikely because of lack of 
proof, and because “witnesses were not… prepared to give evidence against people who they 
knew would not forget [them].”167 “Cook” also states: “the courts treated the suspects 
leniently, generally granting bail as the charges were not seen as serious.”168 Moreover, it 
should be reiterated that the operation was very much Belfast-orientated, with “Joyce” 
alleging that Special Branch “never ever really put the effort into rural areas” – despite the 
evidently lucrative smuggling activities there.169 
 
In summary, although this covert counter-finance effort faced inherent limitations, its success 
was measured not by the amounts frozen, but by its ability to disrupt PIRA’s activities as well 
as to identify important networks and commanders. It is perhaps the nature of this operation, 
and its focus on the more obscure charges of tax evasion that has left it uncovered in the 
literature, with previous investigators perhaps searching for direct threads relating to 
“terrorist financing.” Thus, with “Williams’” revelations in mind, a more effective picture 
emerges of Britain’s counter-finance strategy and of officials’ early concerns regarding the 
funding of PIRA. 
 
Conclusion 
Finance is a key strategic resource in any armed conflict, and there is no doubt that devotion 
to developing a viable economic support base was integral to PIRA’s development and 
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survival throughout the period. The ramifications of PIRA’s fund-raising mechanisms are still 
widely visible today from the continued support by Irish-Americans, to the persistence of 
organized crime in Northern Ireland.170 This study has, though, provided a counter-narrative 
to the popular history and the somewhat vague awareness surrounding the Provisional IRA’s 
finances. It has revised the understanding of how one of the longest-surviving insurgent 
movements sustained itself over thirty years, the conditions under which certain funding 
mechanisms were employed, and how the opposing forces of the British state operated to 
target the economic lifeblood of the organization. More specifically, this study analyzed how 
the financing of PIRA was a multifaceted operation. It considered the role of American 
donations, and found them to have been exaggerated in the contemporary literature. This 
contention is based on revelations from hitherto under-utilized sources, and new quantitative 
calculations that compared the estimated income from non-U.S. fund-raisers with the 
donations sent from NORAID. By distinguishing between America’s economic and material 
contributions, which other works often do not acknowledge, this study demonstrated how 
U.S.-based financial assistance was, to a greater degree, of secondary importance. This study 
also revealed that Belfast and South Armagh were pivotal to the financing operation, and 
brought to light the opportunities for illicit fund-raising activities in an economically deprived 
and conflict-ridden province. 
 
Additionally, an anecdotal context behind PIRA’s involvement in organized “white collar” 
crime networks during the 1980s was presented. Utilizing interview material, this research 
investigated PIRA’s early financing activities. It revealed that such activities were influenced 
by Sinn Féin’s political rise and its associated demand for funds. Whilst it is outside the 
scope of this paper to establish the extent to which Sinn Féin profited from such criminal 
activities, or the extent to which it still does, it poses an interesting question in the current 
political climate. 
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Finally, this analysis explored the understanding of PIRA’s economic evolution from the 
perspective of its primary opponent, the British state. Through doing so, this study 
contributes a corrective to the under-researched role of counter-finance. The research also 
presented an original perspective into a covert Special Branch operation initiated in the 1970s 
to frustrate PIRA’s fund-raising endeavors. The interviewee “Williams” summarized his own 
involvement in the counter-financing mission as a “demoralizing,” and a “very long and 
tortuous track.” He went onto state, however, that “by focusing on that…[I like to think] we 
implemented the key tiles that brought about the peace.”171 Whilst this operation is presumed 
to have disrupted PIRA’s finances, more evidence is needed to ascertain whether it genuinely 
hindered the group. Indeed, there exists much room for further exploration of this initiative, 
and many other areas of contention presented in this research. Yet, equally, perhaps on 
balance it is not inaccurate also to conclude that counter-financing initiatives did, in their 
small way, contribute to the final ending of the conflict.    
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
Sources of income & 
Tentative annual 
Calculations 
Methodological breakdown 
Associated clubs (& 
machines) 
 
 
£300,000 
£1,144,000  + 
 
- Williams estimates that the associated clubs provided the local 
paramilitaries with “£20-25000 a week.”172  
Annual calculation = £22,000 x 52 weeks = £1,144,000. 
- “Cook” claims that the returns from the “Martin Forsythe club/ Felons 
club/South link ESA Club / Ardoyne club…[declared a turnover of] £3/4 
million a year.”173 If these four clubs alone generated this amount, the 
figure above representing all twenty can certainly be deemed credible. 
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=  £1,444,000 - Moreover, Cusack confirms that “dozens of these [clubs] with gross 
turnover[s] running into millions opened in Belfast.”174 
- In addition, “B. Hunt” asserted that there was a “whole load of [illegal 
slot] machines’ in the clubs, which generated ‘many hundreds of 
thousands a year collectively… it certainly wasn’t less.”175 = (taken to 
mean £300,000) 
 
Additional considerations  
 Tupman’s table (1998) declares that “shebeen subsidiaries” were 
making over £4 million.176 However, there is no figure for the 1970s, 
which was presumably somewhat lower. Still, his calculation is a 
useful baseline.  
It should be noted that Tupman’s exclusive use of the term “shebeen” 
may have been quite loose, as this made reference only to the 
unlicensed drinking dens which “Cook” claims raised “very little 
money.”177 
 Although there were security raids in 1977, they appear to have had 
little impact on stemming the flow of PIRA funds. Simply they forced 
the clubs become legal, and some were registered under a front 
name.178 
 Clubs kept their costs low, meaning their profits were maximized. It is 
still uncertain what percentage of their net profit PIRA received, 
though the fact the movement controlled the clubs indicates that it was 
likely to have been considerable. 
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Protection rackets / 
Extortion/ 
Kidnappings 
 
 
 
 
= N/A 
 
The 1976 internal government report concludes it is “impossible” to 
estimate a figure for this fund-raiser.179 Therefore, whilst there are some 
rudimentary estimates from newspapers, this paper will not provide an 
estimate here considering even government officials lacked the confidence 
to do so.  
 
Additional considerations  
 It is worth noting that Tupman believed that “damage insurance” was 
generating an annual income of £6.1 million by 1998.180 
 PIRA “controlled everything” according to “Williams,” and any 
operating tradesmen in the area had to pay a subsidy to the group.181 
 It is also likely that extortion constituted PIRA’s main interaction with 
drugs. For instance, the Provos would seek payment from dealers like 
Tommy Mullen to allow his activities to go unhindered in their 
areas.182 
 PIRA’s protection rackets did impact on some companies, with the 
construction group George Wimpey Ltd withdrawing from the 
province because of intimidation in March 1976.183 
 As for kidnappings, the capture of Ben Dunne in October 1981 
generated $1 million for instance, showing the occasional potential for 
success.184 
Black cabs 
 
 
= £500,000 
-  Horgan and Taylor state that the Falls Road Taxi company declared an 
annual income of “US$1 m… to the British taxation authorities.”185 The 
footnotes show the authors were quoting a source from 1994, when the 
exchange was at £1=$1.53. This was therefore the likely rate at which it 
was converted from the original sterling amount, making the tentative 
annual income in this period, £653,600. However, PIRA would not have 
received the entirety of these profits, and the income figure must therefore 
be reduced. It should also be reduced to represent the 1970s exchange 
rates more accurately.  
- Despite these considerations, Tupman cites security forces’ calculations 
that taxis contributed £750,000 per annum to PIRA’s treasury.186  
- “Joyce” also confirms that PIRA taxis generated “very significant 
incomes” in the 70s.187 Therefore a rounded sum of £500,000 seems 
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reasonable. 
Libyan Donations 
 
= £100,000 
- Cahill’s biography recounts that when the ship smuggling arms from 
Libya to Ireland was intercepted in 1973, “a sealed box containing 
between £40,000 and £50 000 in sterling” was thrown overboard and later 
recovered by an IRA diver.188  
-  It is very possible the Libyans donated more quickly afterwards, as some 
of the assigned resources were withheld in 1973 in case the ship was 
intercepted.189  
- Whilst Libyan leader Colonel Mummar Gaddafi’s donations were 
sporadic, one Sunday Times article cites reports that Libyan agents had 
continued smuggling at least £2million in cash to PIRA between 1982 and 
1986.190 This gives an annual figure of £500,000. 
- The total given by Libya to PIRA to 1977 has been set at £5 million to 
PIRA.191 However, the lack of a reliable source to verify this claim, and 
the fact that this figure probably represented the cost of the arms he 
donated rather than a cash sum, means it can be largely discounted.  
- Nonetheless, when taking into account Cahill’s recording and the 
reported donations sent in the early 1980s, it does allow for the possibility 
of a modest but speculative figure in the realm of £100,000 a year during 
the 1970s. 
Robberies: 
 
 
= £255, 000 
 
 
- Cornick noted in his 1976 report that it is “reliably estimated” that 
between 1971 and 1974, PIRA netted £1,300,000 from bank raids. This 
equates to an annual average of £325 000 
- The Police Service of Northern Ireland “Security Situation Statistics” 
documents that £1.8m was stolen in armed robberies from 1976 up till and 
including 1979.192 If we apply Tupman’s logic that 50 per cent of the 
robberies in the Republic were conducted by PIRA, and if it is assumed 
that each theft generated similar sums, then PIRA would have acquired 
£740,000 over these three years.193 This produces an annual average of 
£185,000 over the final half of the 1970s. 
= Therefore, the average between £325 000 and £185,000 can be taken to 
represent the entire decade = £255, 000. 
 
Additional considerations 
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 It should be noted that although PIRA’s governing body, the Army 
Council occasionally distanced itself from certain heists, volunteers 
had been given tacit approval to conduct armed robberies. Therefore 
all heists that can be linked to PIRA are counted here. 
Fraud (1970s 
account) 
 
 
=N/A 
Again, it is difficult to even make an estimate for this source of income 
due to the lack of available and/or credible data. Newspapers made 
unlikely estimations of multi-million pound frauds during this period.194 
The 1976 Internal government report simply indicates that there was 
‘scope for the misuse of Government funds,’ unable to make any 
quantitative confirmations.195 
Moreover, despite suspicions of mass social-security fraud, arguably this 
fund-raising mechanism soon withered out, with ‘insider’ Gerry Bradley 
documenting that exploiting benefits was quickly discouraged as 
collecting them could damage the group’s internal security.196 
Therefore, in the absence of objective data, this fund-raiser cannot be 
allocated a figure. 
 
1980s  
 
The Northern Ireland Office estimated that PIRA had an annual income of £5.3 million by 1990, 
following its fund-raising expansion in the preceding decade.197 Fraud and smuggling were the 
primary fund-raisers according to informers and law-enforcement personnel, and therefore the 
figures calculated below can be seen to correlate with the government’s data.198 
Fraud (1980s 
account) 
 
 
£300,000 
£903,614 
 
= £1,203,600 
(rounded) 
- “According to the House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee…video piracy alone netted PIRA over $1.5 million per year.”199 
(1998 conversion rate: $1.66. = £903,614) 
- PIRA also established a “readymade distribution network” for criminals 
seeking to dispatch their stolen, smuggled or counterfeit CDs, MP3s, and 
clothing, according to “Hunt.”200 The group then received a “considerable cut” 
from the profits.201  
- Harnden comments that between 1991 and 1997, PIRA received “hundreds 
of thousands of pounds” (taken to mean £300,000) from illegitimate 
compensation claims in South Armagh.202  
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- These are only a few examples of PIRA’s fraud involvements. The total sum 
presented can therefore be deemed a conservative one.  
Smuggling 
 
 
 
£1, 500,000  
300,000     + 
416,000 
 
= £2, 216,000 
-  “Cook” recounts that PIRA were particularly involved in cigarette 
smuggling in the Far East by the late 1980s, and that “each 40 foot container 
was worth 500K in profit.”203 A superficial guess that PIRA managed to sell 
the full contents of 3 containers a year, gives a sum of £1.5 million.  
- Diesel smuggling was also rife in “Slab” Murphy’s farm, which straddled the 
border between the North and the Irish Republic. Harnden comments that “in 
1998, Customs and Excise Officers in Northern Ireland estimated that at least 
£100 million a year was lost through smuggling: [and] the South Armagh 
Brigade was netting a substantial proportion.”204 It can be estimated that at 
least £300,000 went directly to the PIRA Brigade’s treasury, when taking into 
account the percentage extracted from the fraud profits. 
- Murphy’s farm also transported livestock and grain from the Republic into 
Northern Ireland several times over to benefit repeatedly from the European 
Economic Communities’ trading subsidies. “British intelligence believed that 
in the mid-1980s, at least £8,000…per week went to PIRA coffers through 
such schemes.”205 
= 8,000 x 52 weeks = £416,000 
 
- The total figure is supported further by O’Callaghan’s estimate that the 
smuggling trade was “making millions” for PIRA.206 
 
 
Appendix 2 
List of archival files denied access and unavailable at The National Archive, Kew: 
HO 325/540, Home Office, “Review of Special Branch Duties and Liaison with the Security 
Services” (1983-1994). 
CJ 4/2832, Northern Ireland Office, “Paramilitaries and Economic Activities in Northern 
Ireland, Including Organised Crime” (1978-1979). 
CJ 4/2830, Northern Ireland Office, “Paramilitaries and Economic Activities in Northern 
Ireland, Including Organised Crime” (1978-9). 
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CJ 4/3137, Northern Ireland Office, “Steering Group on the Economic Activities of 
Paramilitary Organisations” (1978) 
PREM 16/1859, Prime Minister’s Office, “Review of Security Services” (1976-1978). 
CAB 190/32, Cabinet Office, “Ireland Assessments and Summaries” (1972). 
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